



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY:¹ SOME REASONS FOR PREDICTING THEIR MORE ACTIVE CO- ÖPERATION IN THE FUTURE

By HARRY ELMER BARNES,
Department of History and International Relations, Clark University

I. THE CHIEF PHASES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORIO- GRAPHY ²

1. *The Growth of Scientific Method in Gathering the Data of History*

Though history, as a record of human achievement in the widest sense of that term, goes back to the earliest archeological evidences of man's handiwork which have persisted since the first stone ages, it is only within the last century that written history has been either relatively complete in its scope or decently accurate in its content. Its progress has been the result of the successive contributions of every age from the days when the first savage began to scrawl picture-writing on stones or trees to the appearance of Giry's treatise on *Diplomatic* or the publication of Merz's "History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century." The honor of having originated the first real historical narrative belongs to the Hebrew author of the Jahvist sources of the Old Testament at the close of the 10th century B. C. Most significant improvements were made by the Greek and Roman writers of classical antiquity. Herodotus first conceived the notion of a history of civilization; Thucydides introduced the principles of accuracy and

¹ The following survey of some of the chief relations between history and psychology can in no way be regarded as the view of the majority of present day historians. Even the general attitude towards the subject taken in this article constitutes the point of view of only a small group of the more advanced historical students, while for this particular exposition of their doctrines the author must be held personally responsible. Others in sympathy with this same point of departure might present the subject in a radically different and more effective manner.

² For a fuller sketch of the main stages in the growth of historical science the reader is referred to the writer's article on "History: Its Rise and Development," in the forthcoming edition of the *Encyclopædia Americana*.

relevance into the handling of historical material; Caesar revealed himself to be a keen observer of contemporary history and an unequalled writer of apologetic historical memoirs; Livy's patriotic rhetoric has never been surpassed, while Tacitus stands out as the greatest portrait painter and moralist among the historians of antiquity. With the coming of the so-called "Middle Ages," history writing, along with other branches of culture, suffered a marked decline and retrogression, due to the paralyzing Christian eschatology and the primitive cultural level of the northern barbarians who overthrew the declining Roman civilization in the period following the 4th century. Even the greatest historians of this age—Bede, Paul the Deacon, Otto of Freising, Matthew of Paris and Commines, failed to reach the level of Thucydides and Tacitus. The literary revival following the 13th century known as Humanism, secularized the historian's viewpoint, led to the recovery and editing of lost classical texts, created some embryonic canons of historical criticism, and produced in the works of Machiavelli and Guicciardini systematic histories worthy to rank with those of the best classical writers. This secularizing and critical movement was set back by the great religious reaction in the Protestant revolt and the Catholic Counter-Reformation, but some progress was made even here through the feverish attempt to recover the sources of ecclesiastic history. With the dawn of the modern order following the Commercial Revolution of the 16th century many most significant innovations were brought into the field of historical science. The discovery of new lands, peoples, customs, and institutions widened the outlook of the historian. The new scientific philosophy shattered the "Christian Epic" and produced a healthy interest in mankind and its development. The subsequent development of Romanticism produced an intellectual reaction, but this was to some degree off-set by the great emotional interest which it aroused in history and by the extension of the interest of the historian to many new fields, such as philology, mythology, anthropology and comparative religion. The growth of nationalism following the French Revolution stimulated the production of the great collections of the sources of national history like the German *Monumenta*, the *Documents Inédits* and the *Rolls Series*, and the patriotic national histories associated with the works of Droysen, Treitschke and Sybel; Froude, Macaulay and Green; Michelet and Martin; and Bancroft and Fiske. The critical sifting of historical evidence, which had begun in the days of Humanism in

the work of Blondus, Beatus Rhenanus, Vadianus, Zurita, Camden and De Thou, was revived and carried on by Mabillon and the Benedictines of St. Maur, and by Tillemont, Leibnitz, Mauratori, Thoyras, Bayle, Dubos and Beaufort. Most of the previous lines of development converged in the work of Barthold Niebuhr, who is conventionally regarded as the founder of modern scientific historiography. Since his day the critical methodology has been further refined and the events of the past scientifically determined and catalogued in the works of the students of oriental and classical history, the ultra-scholarly medievalists and the more objective national historians, such as Ranke, Aulard, Gardiner, Osgood and Channing.

In this way vast collections of well ascertained facts were brought together and the mechanism of the historical scholar perfected in so far as it related to the externals of historical information. But in almost all cases the labors of these historians had resulted only in the collection of the *data* of history. History was in a condition not unlike that in which the physicist, chemist, or biologist would find himself if supplied with a vast body of notebooks containing the carefully set down records of countless experiments, but without any real attempt to interpret the significance of this mass of material or to derive from it great scientific laws of general applicability. This inclination of the majority of historians to resist being seduced from the determination of facts and the narration of successive events was not without some basis at the time. The memory of grotesque attempts like that of Hegel, to adapt the facts of history to substantiate a fantastic view of historical development was fresh in their mind and, moreover, the facts upon which any sound interpretation could be based had not yet been fully gathered. It would, however, betray clouded thinking to hold that this gathering of facts marked the final completion of the task of the historian no less than it would for the scientist to contend that his work was at an end when he had tabulated his observations. The careful and painstaking interpretation of historical material, far from being unscientific and wholly aside from the task of the historian, in reality constitutes the final rounding out to completion of the scientific method in history and gives some meaning and significance to the vast array of facts which have been brought together by previous historians. This matter has been effectively stated by Professor James Harvey Robinson in the following citation:—

"History, in order to become scientific, had first to become historical. Singularly enough, what we now regard as the strictly historical interest was almost missed by historians before the nineteenth century. They narrated such past events as they believed would interest the reader; they commented on these with a view of instructing him. They took some pains to find out how things really were—*wie es eigentlich gewesen*. To this extent they were scientific, although their motives were mainly literary, moral, or religious. They did not, however, in general try to determine how things had come about—*wie es eigentlich geworden*. History has remained for two or three thousand years mainly a record of past events, and this definition satisfies the thoughtless still. But it is one thing to describe what once was; it is still another to attempt to determine how it came about."³

2. *The Development of Attempts to Interpret the Data of History*

As Professor Shotwell has made clear,⁴ the prevailing types of historical interpretation through the ages faithfully reflect the dominating intellectual interest of the successive eras. The Divine epics of the ancient Orient were superseded by the mythological and the philosophical interpretations of the thinkers of classical antiquity. With the general acceptance of Christianity, the classical mythology was replaced by that eschatological conception which dominated historical interpretation from Augustine to Bossuet. With the coming of the Commercial Revolution and its violent shock to the old intellectual order, there arose the critical and rationalistic school of Bacon, Descartes, Voltaire and Hume, which on account of its being too far in advance of the intellectual orientation of the masses, tended to lapse into the idealism of Kant and Fichte and the romanticism of Burke, Bonald, DeMaistre, and Hegel. The growth of nationalism following the French Revolution tended to give temporary precedence to the political mode of interpretation, but the great transformations which constituted the Industrial Revolution of necessity doomed so superficial a view to an ephemeral existence. The unprecedented breadth and depth of modern knowledge and intellectual interests have produced a number of interpretations of historical development, most of which represent the outgrowth of some one or another of the outstanding intellectual and social transformations of the last century.

With the growth of modern natural science and the critical

³ J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, p. 62. Cf. also J. T. Shotwell, "The Interpretation of History," in *The American Historical Review*, July, 1913, pp. 692ff.

⁴ Shotwell, loc. cit.

attitude in the appropriation and assimilation of knowledge, the effort to form some magnificent and systematic philosophical scheme for the organization and presentation of historical development, such as was devised by writers from Augustine to Hegel, has greatly declined. Scepticism of any formal philosophy of history seems to be but a necessary accompaniment of our increasing knowledge of the infinite complexity of social and historical phenomena, as these attempts to reduce history to such simplicity savor too much of the *à priori* method, now so thoroughly discredited. To take the place of the older dogmatic philosophy of history there have developed what may be called "interpretations" of historical data. These at present differ from the older philosophy of history in the absence of any teleological element and in the rejection of the deductive method.⁵ They aim solely to emphasize and bring into high relief those factors, which, according to the various schools of interpretation, seem to have been most influential in producing the civilization of to-day. The interpretation of history is, in short, the attempt to supplement Ranke's aimless search for what occurred in the past by at least a feeble and humble effort to explain how the present order came about. Far from being less scientific than the older program of Ranke, it really constitutes the perfect completion of scientific method in historiography, in the same way that the formulation of the great laws of natural science constitute the logical consummation of the task of gathering data by observation and experimentation in the laboratory.

There are at present some eight definite schools of historical interpretation among the representatives of the modernized students of historical phenomena, each of which has made an important contribution to our knowledge of historical development. They are in no sense mutually exclusive but are rather, to a large degree, supplementary. They may be designated as the personal or "great man" theory; the economic or materialistic; the allied geographical or environmental; the spiritual or idealistic; the scientific; the anthropological; the sociological; and the synthetic or "collective psychological." It may be pointed out in passing that, in the main, the older type of historian either clings to the outworn theory of political causation or holds that historical development is entirely arbitrary and obeys no ascertainable laws. The best known of these schools of historical interpretation, and the only one

⁵ Shotwell, loc. cit., p. 693.

that the current political historians accord any consideration, is that which found its most noted representatives in Carlyle and Froude, who claimed that the great personalities of history were the main causative factors in historical development. This view is, of course, closely allied to the catastrophic interpretation of the 18th century nationalists. Perhaps the most distinguished adherents today are Prof. Émile Faguet of Paris, Mr. W. H. Mallock of England, and Prof. William A. Dunning of Columbia University. The contributions of the economic school of historical interpretation, which was founded by Feuerbach and Marx and has been carried on by a host of later and less dogmatic writers, such as Rogers, Ashley, Schmoller, Loria, Veblen, Simons, Beard, Bogart, and Simkhovitch, are too familiar to call for any additional elaboration. In its best and most generally accepted form, it contends that the prevailing mode and status of the economic processes in society will to a very large degree decide the nature of existing social and political institutions. In spite of slight exaggerations, no phase of historical interpretation has been more fruitful or epoch-making. Immediately related is the geographical interpretation of history, which began with Hippocrates and continued through the writings of Strabo, Vitruvius, Bodin, Montesquieu, and Buckle and has been revived and given a more scientific interpretation in the hands of such writers as Karl Ritter, Ratzel, Reclus, Semple, Metchnikoff, Demolins, and Huntington. Since the days of Ritter no respectable historian has dared to chronicle the history of a nation without first having acquired a knowledge of its geography. Widely at variance with the economic and geographical interpretation is the somewhat belated offshoot of the idealism of Fichte and Hegel, to be found in the so-called spiritual interpretation of history, which finds its most ardent advocates in Prof. Rudolph Eucken of Germany and Prof. Shailer Matthews of Chicago. Professor Matthews thus defines this view of history: "The spiritual interpretation of history must be found in the discovery of spiritual forces coöperating with geographic and economic to produce a general tendency toward conditions which are truly personal. And these conditions will not be found in generalizations concerning metaphysical entities, but in activities of worthful men finding self-expression in social relations for the ever more complete subjection of physical nature to human welfare." Viewed in this sense, this type of interpretation can be said to have a considerable affinity with the "great man" theory and

apparently aims to reconcile this doctrine with the critical and synthetic interpretation, under cover of a common theological orientation. Closely conformable to this mode of interpretation is Prof. E. D. Adams' effort to connect the historical development of the United States with a succession of great national ideals, the origins of which are not explained. The attempt to view human progress as directly correlated with the advances in natural science received its first great exposition in the writings of Condorcet, was revived by Comte and Buckle and greatly attracted Henry Adams. Aside from the attention given to it by students of the history of science, such as Danne-mann, Sarton, Duhem, Tannery, Pearson, Shipley, Whetham, Libby, and Sedgwick, this phase of historical interpretation has been sadly neglected by recent historians, though Prof. F. S. Marvin and Prof. Lynn Thorndike have recently shown its promising potentialities. It has been emphasized incidentally by Professors Lamprecht, Seignobos, Shotwell, and Robinson in their synthetic interpretation of history, but it remains the least exploited and yet, perhaps, the most promising of all the special phases of historical interpretation. Its adherents claim a more fundamental causal importance than can be assigned to the economic interpretation in that they contend that the prevailing state of scientific knowledge and application will determine the existing modes of economic life and activities. Especially fruitful has been the anthropological interpretation of history. While not ignoring the contributions of earlier students, modern anthropology owed its origin primarily to the researches and writings of Tylor in England, Bastian in Germany, and Boas in America.⁶ Its purpose is, according to Professor Boas, "to reconstruct the early history of mankind, and, wherever possible, to express in the form of laws ever-recurring modes of historical happenings." The chief point of contact between anthropology and history is found in the attempt of the former to discover and formulate the laws of cultural evolution. With the controversies between the older school of unilateral evolutionists, represented by Spencer, Avebury, Morgan, and Frazer, the more recent advocates of the doctrine of "diffusion," such as F. Graebner, W. H. R. Rivers, and Elliott Smith, and the exponents of the so-called theory of the "convergent development" of cultural similarities and repetitions, among the most important of whom are Ehrenreich, Boas, Lowie, and Goldenweiser, it will be impossible to

⁶ Cf. A. C. Haddon, *History of Anthropology*.

deal in this place.⁷ It will be sufficient to insist upon the fact that no historian can regard himself as competent to attempt any large synthesis of historical material without having thoroughly acquainted himself with these fundamental attempts to bring definite laws of development out of the chaos of historical facts. An attempt to link up cultural anthropology with a dynamic history has recently been made in two thoughtful books by Professor Teggart of the University of California.⁸ Dr. Goldenweiser in a recent profound article has endeavored to provide a set of categories and a systematic methodological point of departure for scientific history and critical anthropology.⁹ The closely related sociological interpretation of history goes as far back as the Arab, Ibn Khaldun; was developed by Vico, Turgot, Ferguson, Condorcet, Comte, and Spencer; and has its ablest modern representatives in Professor Giddings of Columbia, Professor Thomas of Chicago, and Professor Hobhouse of London.¹⁰ Professor Giddings admirably describes this theory as "an attempt to account for the origin, structure and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital and psychical causes, working together in a process of evolution."¹¹ As a genetic social science, it works hand in hand with cultural anthropology in the effort to explain the repetitions and uniformities in historical development and to formulate the laws of historical causation. But the latest, most inclusive, and most important of all types of historical interpretation, and the one which, perhaps, most perfectly represents the newer history, is the synthetic or "collective psychological." According to this type of historical interpretation no single category of "causes" is sufficient to explain all phases and periods of historical development.

⁷ A good summary of the literature of these theoretical positions in modern anthropology is contained in A. A. Goldenweiser's "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," *Journal of American Folklore*, 1913, Vol. XXVI. See also R. H. Lowie's *Culture and Ethnology*, and F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, Chapter VII.

⁸ F. J. Teggart, *Prolegomena to History; The Process of History*.

⁹ A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of Categories for an Introduction to Social Science," in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 1918.

¹⁰ This statement is not to be taken as an indication of the position of these writers in the general sociological field, but refers merely to their preeminence in the field of historical sociology.

¹¹ F. H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, p. 8; but see particularly his "A Theory of Social Causation," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 3rd series, Vol. V, No. 2.

Nothing less than the collective psychology of any period can be deemed adequate to determine the historical development of that age, and it is the task of the historian to discover, evaluate, and set forth the chief factors which create and shape the collective view of life and determine the nature of the group struggle for existence and improvement. The most eminent leaders of this school of historical interpretation, though with widely divergent antecedents and points of view, have been Professor Lamprecht of Leipzig; Professor Ferrero of Italy; Professors Tarde, Lévy-Bruhl, Fouillée, Seignobos, and Durkheim of Paris; Professors Marvin, Zimmern, and Barker of London; and Professors Robinson and Shotwell of Columbia University. Their general doctrine has gained particular acceptance in France, probably on account of the early and extensive development of social psychology in that country.

II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY.

1. *The Nature and Historical Background of the Psychological Interpretation of History.*

The essence of the psychological interpretation of history is the thesis that the determining factor in historical development is the collective psychology of an era and of a given cultural group. Its adherents rightfully claim that it is not only the most scientific but also the most all-inclusive of the various types of historical interpretation. It is the most scientific because it is now generally agreed that man functions as an active agent through his mental mechanism, and the most comprehensive because it takes into account every influence operating upon the group studied, which would in any way affect its psychic reactions. While broad in its scope, however, it is much more coherent and specific than a general history of events in that it has a definite orientation and organizing principle. While this interpretation is primarily socio-psychic, it gives due consideration to the part played by the dominating personalities in shaping the collective psychology and would even, in a complete form, attempt a psychological interpretation of these very personalities, in so far as such procedure is possible.

It is often held that the origin of the present day psychological interpretation of history is an offshoot or further development of the older subjective philosophies of history, which culminated in the grand, if fantastic, schemes like those of Hegel and the Romanticists, but it seems much more accurate

to regard it as a product of the growth of modern science and civilization. The Deists brought forth the notion, in fundamental opposition to the depressing theological views of Augustine and Calvin, that man is inherently decent and that his action is subject to natural laws, such as had been revealed by Newton and his fellow scientists. They held that man was both worth studying and possible to study. Another important prerequisite was the further development of experimental natural science, and particularly of psychology. Especially significant and stimulating was the new genetic psychology set forth by G. Stanley Hall and J. Mark Baldwin, which emphasized the illuminating and useful analogy between the mental development of the individual and the race.

But individual psychology, important as it is, could not supply all that was needed to furnish the mechanism for the psychological interpretation of the historical processes; it was necessary to have a social psychology built up on the laws of individual psychology and sociology. For this the growth of modern industrialism was the utmost significance. This brought with it the increase in the volume and rapidity of social and psychic contacts through the concentration of the population in the great industrial cities and through the development of the new means of communicating information. As a natural result of these antecedents there grew up in the latter half of the 19th century a science of collective or social psychology, which was foreshadowed by Lewes, Bagehot, Lazarus, and Steinhal, and was effectively cultivated by Wundt, Dilthey and Tönnies in Germany; by Fouillée, Guyau, Tarde, Durkheim, and Le Bon in France; by Sighele in Italy; by McDougall, Trotter, and Wallas in England; and by Giddings, Ross, Sumner, Cooley, Ellwood, Baldwin, Davis, and Bogardus in America.¹²

While this new social psychology was primarily devoted to a general analysis of contemporary conditions or to forming a theoretical basis for systematic sociology, even these writers made some very significant contributions to the psychological interpretation of history. Dilthey's analysis of the relation of history to the sciences of the mind; Tarde's notion of the importance of imitation in the continuity of history; Durkheim's views on the significance of the crowd-psychological state in cultural and social development; Trotter's elaboration of the significance of "herd-instinct;" Sumner's most suggestive analysis of the importance of the "folkways" and

¹² See M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*.

"mores;" and Ross' study of the psychic basis of social control, are among the best known of these valuable suggestions handed over from this field to aid the progressive historian. At about the same time that social psychology was being elaborated there was gradually developing a genetic view of history — the idea of the continuity of history, which is based upon the knowledge that our present cultural complex is primarily the product of a long inheritance from past conditions and that the present can be understood only when viewed in the light of its historical antecedents.¹³ When this attitude towards history was accepted by a few of the more progressive students it was easy for them to comprehend that social psychology had put at their disposal exactly the methodology and point of attack which was necessary to interpret the significance of history and show how the modern age had come about. It seemed clear that if the collective psychology was an all-important factor in modern life, it should have had a great, if not equal, significance in all ages. The systematic following up of this clue has constituted essentially the psychological interpretation of history in so far as it has yet been developed.

There were, to be sure, some much earlier anticipations of this point of view. Voltaire had explained cultural differences as being due to the variation between the distinct genius of one people and that of another, but his view that this "genius" was essentially immutable was non-historical. Turgot had set forth the notion of the continuity of history. The Romanticists, following Herder, had regarded civilization as the product of obscurely working creative psychic forces and had revelled in discussions of the *Weltgeist* and the *Zeitgeist*. Comte had set forth his very suggestive interpretation of the psychic evolution of mankind according to the three stages of intellectual development — the theological, the metaphysical and the positive or scientific. Burckhardt, Freytag, and Riehl in Germany, and Green in England emphasized the significance of the masses as opposed to the few conspicuous individuals. Taine had laid great stress upon the psychic milieu as a factor in cultural development, and Bagehot had presented his brilliant survey of political development from the custom-making age, through the period of the origin of states to the age of discussion. But none of these examples of a trend towards the psychological interpretation of history were based upon a

¹³ This concept of the continuity of history was first systematically stated by Turgot in his Discourses at the Sorbonne in 1750. See Stephens, *Life and Writings of Turgot*, pp. 159ff.

sound comprehension of either scientific psychology or a genetic history. The first systematic attempt to correlate history and psychology was the work of the distinguished Leipzig historian, Karl Lamprecht, who based his doctrines on the psychological investigation of the famous Leipzig psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt.

2. *Karl Lamprecht's Socio-Psychological Interpretation of History*

Winning recognition as a historian by a voluminous monograph on the medieval economic history of the Rhine valley, Lamprecht began to publish his *Deutsche Geschichte* in 1891, in which he illustrated his views on historical interpretation. From that time until his recent death he accompanied his systematic historical work by an unending controversy with the exponents of the older historical notions. In this debate he upheld his thesis that "history is a socio-psychological science" concerned primarily with the "social-psychic," as contrasted with the "individual-psychic" factors which had been emphasized by the previous conventional narrative and biographical history. To him history was the collective psychology of the past rather than the collective biography, as had been the opinion of the typical historian who had generally followed Carlyle's views on historical causation, if, indeed, he believed in historical causation at all. Probably the best succinct statement of Lamprecht's principles is contained in the following summary by the eminent English historian John B. Bury:

"Among the evolutional attempts to subsume the course of history under general syntheses, perhaps the most important is that of Lamprecht, whose 'Kulturhistorische' attempt to discover and assign the determining causes. German history exhibits the (indirect) influence of the Comtist school. It is based upon psychology, which, in his views, holds among the sciences of mind (*Geisteswissenschaften*) the same place (that of a *Grundwissenschaft*) which mechanics hold among the sciences of nature. History, by the same comparison, corresponds to biology, and, according to him, it can only become scientific if it is reduced to general concepts (*Begriffe*). Historical movements and events are of a psychical character, and Lamprecht conceives a given phase of civilization as 'a collective psychical condition (*seelischer Gesamtzustand*)' controlling the period, 'a diapason which penetrates all psychical phenomena and thereby all historical events of the time.' He has worked out a series of such phases, 'ages of changing psychical diapason,' in his *Deutsche Geschichte*, with the aim of showing that all the feelings and actions of each age can be explained by the diapason; and has attempted to prove that these diapasons are exhibited in other social developments, and are consequently not singular but typical. He maintains further that these ages succeed

each other in a definite order; the principle being that the collective psychical development begins with the homogeneity of all the individual members of a society and, through heightened psychical activity, advances in the form of a continually increasing differentiation of the individuals (this is akin to the Spencerian formula). This process, evolving psychical freedom from psychical constraint, exhibits a series of psychical phenomena which define successive periods of civilization. The process depends on two simple principles, that no idea can disappear without leaving behind it an effect or influence, and that all psychical life, whether in a person or in a society, means change, the acquisition of new mental contents. It follows that the new have to come to terms with the old, and this leads to a synthesis which determines the character of a new age. Hence the ages of civilization are defined as the 'highest concepts for subsuming without exception all psychical phenomena of the development of human societies, that is, of all historical events.' Lamprecht deduces the idea of a special historical science, which might be called 'historical ethnology,' dealing with the ages of civilization, and bearing the same relation to (descriptive or narrative) history as ethnology to ethnography. Such a science obviously corresponds to Comte's social dynamics, and the comparative method, on which Comte laid so much emphasis, is the principal instrument of Lamprecht."¹⁴

Working from the above premises Lamprecht has outlined what he regards as the great stages in the socio-psychological development of western civilization. The earliest or the primitive stage he designates as the "symbolic." This was superseded in the early Middle Ages by the "typical," that period of differentiation which produced various distinct types of culture. The later medieval period was the age of the "conventional" in culture, social life, industry, art, and religion. This was followed by the period of "individualism" from the Renaissance through the *Aufklärung*, an epoch in which, in the Protestant portions of Europe, the individual might hold direct communion with God, and was everywhere distinguished by great individual works of genius in science, art, literature, commerce, and politics. Beginning with the Romantics and extending to the Industrial Revolution was the period of "subjectivism," characterized by the great emotional revolt against rationalism. The period since the Industrial Revolution is declared to be one of "nervous tension" in which mankind is still groping for a central ideal or a distinguishing socio-psychic

¹⁴ J. B. Bury, "Darwinism and History," in the volume entitled *Evolution in Modern Thought*, Boni and Liveright's *Modern Library*, pp. 260-62. Some critics, notably Bernheim, have held that Lamprecht derived his views directly from Comte, but Lamprecht denies any such dependence and maintains the complete originality of his scheme, while admitting its similarity to Comte's. See his *What is History?* (1904), p. 157, note.

principle.¹⁵ Though these stages or epochs have been the organizing principle of his voluminous *German History*, Lamprecht maintains that they are typical of social evolution in general among all peoples that have developed to the level of modern civilization.¹⁶

While Lamprecht's original method of interpreting historical material involved him in a bitter controversy with the conventional political and episodal historians,¹⁷ he has received remarkable support from the more progressive German historians and patrons of learning. He has been enabled to establish the remarkable *Institut für Universal Geschichte* at Leipzig and has trained and inspired a large number of promising followers. Georg Steinhausen not only contributed many scholarly monographic studies on diverse phases of German cultural development, but, along with Walter Goetz also founded in 1903 the *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, a periodical devoted to advancing the cause of Lamprecht's type of historical interpretation. Kurt Breysig, in his *Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit*, has extended the new methods to a monumental attempt to trace in a unified and coherent form the cultural evolution of the modern European world. Eberhard Gothein has ably defended the province, aims, and methods of the history of civilization and has himself made notable contributions to this field through monographs on the history of south Italian civilization and on the intellectual setting of the Renaissance. In addition to these writers, Lamprecht has exerted a deep influence upon many other European historians, as well as upon progressive historians in America, where, in 1904, he delivered in the form of a series of lectures his most extensive exposition and defense of his historical method and point of view.¹⁸

Besides these and many other unmentioned studies in *Kulturgeschichte* which have been more or less intimately related to Lamprecht's influences, many writers in other countries have presented surveys of cultural development which have stressed the psychological element. Among the more notable of these are Guglielmo Ferrero's "Greatness and Decline of Rome," Rafael Altamira's history of Spanish civilization, Alfred Rambaud's history of French civilization, Paul Milyoukov's survey

¹⁵ Lamprecht, *What is History?* Lecture II.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Lectures IV-V.

¹⁷ See G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 589-93.

¹⁸ His *What is History?* delivered at the Congress of Arts and Sciences at St. Louis and at Columbia University.

of Russian cultural development Charles Seignobos' general survey of the history of civilization, and the elaborate general history of civilization prepared by the venerable and scholarly Swiss bibliographer of St. Gall, Otto Henne-am-Rhyn.

3. *The Defects of Lamprecht's System and Methodology*

While all who welcome a new and more fundamental approach to historical problems must recognize the great value of the work of Lamprecht in boldly staking out a relatively new field, must agree that he was fundamentally right in maintaining that the chief task of historiography from this stage in its development onward must be to discover through a study of the past how the civilization of the present has come about, and will probably accede to his thesis that the most promising phase of historical research with this end in view is the study of the transformations in the collective psychology through the ages, there is a very general trend among the more recent investigators in this field to doubt the complete validity of Lamprecht's specific interpretation of the course of history from the socio-psychological point of view. They feel that he was as much interested in trying to fit the facts of history into his original and suggestive scheme of historical development, which he had worked out in advance, as he was to discover how the present order of things has actually developed. The more critical converts to this new line of approach hold that the position of Lamprecht in the socio-psychological interpretation of history is highly comparable to that of Lewis H. Morgan and the unilateral evolutionists in the development of cultural ethnology. This group set forth what must always be regarded as the basic principle of their science, namely, that it should be concerned with explaining the cultural repetitions and identities, which were evident to the student, and with formulating the laws of cultural development. But instead of waiting for necessary data to be gathered through a patient intensive study of various cultural areas, they formulated in advance, from very imperfect knowledge, schemes of orderly and sequential development of culture and institutions and adapted the facts of ethnography, wrenched from their context, to bolster up their particular near *à priori* systems of evolutionary development. The more recent works of Ehrenreich in Germany; Marett and Rivers in England; Durkheim and his school in France; and, above all, Boas and his disciples in America, have demolished these logical and pretentious, but wholly unscientific ethnological card-houses, have

made it clear that only the most careful inductive study of ethnographic evidence will furnish the data upon which to base the laws of cultural development, and have rendered it equally certain that such investigation will demonstrate the futility of hoping to establish any simple unilateral evolutionary schemes of universal applicability.¹⁹ The more critical workers in this field of historical interpretation believe that Lamprecht's work has suffered from this same fault. What Dr. Goldenweiser has said of Breysig's work will apply equally well to that of Lamprecht in its theoretical and methodological aspects: "In all such systems the discrepancies in the historical processes compared are never rated as theoretically on a par with the uniformities, nor as of equal significance. The discrepancies are either overlooked, thus involving a serious misrepresentation of the facts, or they are regarded as somehow less real or less deep than the uniformities, or they are brushed aside as 'disturbing agencies.'"²⁰ As the work of Boas and his followers in the United States has marked the most effective attempt to reconstruct cultural ethnology on a scientific and inductive basis, so, with the psychological interpretation of history, the most significant development of the more objective and scientific approach to this subject has been associated with the work of Professor James Harvey Robinson of Columbia University, and with that of the followers whom he has attracted in this country to the study of "intellectual history."

4. *Professor James Harvey Robinson and the Development of Intellectual History*

Professor Robinson accepts as the foundation of his approach to the study and interpretation of history Lamprecht's dictum that the historian should concern himself chiefly with discovering how the present has developed out of the past,²¹ but he rejects absolutely the attempt to force the study and interpretation of the past into any such artificial and *à priori* scheme of cultural evolution as Lamprecht has devised. He would even reject as wholly unnatural and misleading, in view of the continuity of history, the conventional periodizing of

¹⁹ See the references given above in note 7.

²⁰ A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of Categories for an Introduction to Social Science," in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XV, p. 589. This article is, perhaps, the most profound discussion yet contributed to the subject of the theoretical and methodological relationships of history and psychology.

²¹ James Harvey Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 62, 78, 102-3.

the past as "ancient," "medieval," and so on, and will admit only a tentative division of intellectual development for heuristic purposes into the: Primitive, Ancient, Hellenic, Patristic, Scholastic and its decline, the *Aufklärung*, and the present age, since the industrial and scientific revolutions of the last century.²² Believing with Lamprecht in the superior importance of the socio-psychic over the individual-psychic, and being an extremely ardent exponent of the doctrine of the continuity of history, he holds that the task of determining how the present world order has developed can best be solved by studying the changing attitudes of the intellectual classes from primitive times to the present day. By this he means not merely an investigation of the elaborate philosophical systems of isolated thinkers, but of the prevailing intellectual orientation and outlook upon life, in the broadest sense of that term, which has existed in various successive epochs from the earliest times. Being wholly inductive and non-schematic, his method of approach makes possible an unlimited adaptation to any new developments in either psychology or history. It also recognizes much more freely and fully than Lamprecht the influence that great personalities may have had in shaping the socio-psychic factors.

As Professor Robinson makes clear, this notion is not a new one but was ably and distinctly stated by Francis Bacon, who, indeed, a century hence may be looked upon as quite as much the harbinger of the "New History" as of the new inductive scientific method. In the following citation Professor Robinson quotes this significant passage from Bacon and offers his own comments upon its value to the modern historical student:—

"Lord Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning*, says: 'No man hath propounded to himself the general *state of learning* to be described and represented from age to age, as many have done the works of nature and the State civil and ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world seemeth to me to be as a statue of Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and life of the person. And yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools, authors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations touching the invention of arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects; their inventions, their traditions; their diverse administrations and managings; their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions,

²² J. H. Robinson, *Outline Syllabus of the History of the Intellectual Class in Western Europe*, p. 28.

oblivions, removes; with the causes and occasions of them, and all other events concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world; I may truly affirm to be wanting.' . . . Bacon's reproach is still merited, for no one has as yet, so far as I know, ever clearly conceived of a general history of the chief opinions of the intellectual class.

"Yet what more vital has the past to teach us than the manner in which our convictions on large questions have arisen, developed and changed? We do not, assuredly, owe most of them to painful personal excogitation but inherit them, along with the institutions and social habits of the land in which we live. The content of a well-stocked mind is the product of tens of thousands of years of accumulation. Many widespread notions could by no possibility have originated in modern times, but have arisen in conditions quite alien to those of the present. We have too often, in consequence, an outworn intellectual equipment for new and unheard-of tasks. Only a study of the vicissitudes of human opinion can make us fully aware of this and enable us to readjust our views so as to adapt them to our present environment. If it be true that opinion tends, in the dynamic age in which we live, to lag far behind our changing environment, how can we better discover the anachronisms in our views and in our attitude toward the world than by studying their origin? Is not Bacon right in accusing the historian of presenting us with an image of the past without its great cyclopean eye, which alone reveals its spirit and life?"²³

More than being merely the field of historical activity which seems far better adapted than any other to interpreting the significance of the past for an understanding of the present, intellectual history has a far richer and more extensive body of data than any other field. The volume of written records describing what man has been thinking of, or has avowed that he has been thinking of from the earliest times, exceeds beyond comparison the amount of historical information which has been preserved in any other field. Of the lives of the greatest figures in the history of culture and thought it frequently happens that little or nothing is known, while many volumes of their thoughts have been preserved. Further, intellectual history not only has at its disposal a vastly greater and more varied assortment of sources than any other branch of history but also, unlike that for any other phase of the subject, almost all of this information is of a sort which can be made use of with confidence by the historian. In an attempt to reconstruct the political history of the past, for example, the general tendency of a generation or an age to exaggerate, lie, distort accounts, ignore vital events in contemporary political life, or attribute political and military success or failure to miraculous causes would render the writings of such an age of almost no value to the political historian, while to the historian of the

²³ Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 101-3.

intellectual reactions of humanity it would have a high degree of value, for, as Seignobos has expressed it, "the psychological fact" exists unimpaired. The very prevalence of allegory, miracle-mongering, forgery, or general distortion of fact would constitute a problem of the utmost interest and importance for the historian of the psychological development of the race.

Finally, intellectual history not only best serves to explain the origins of the present but also constitutes the one completely disconcerting answer to the conservative who would invoke a misunderstood "human nature" and an ignorantly distorted history to aid him in resisting the onward push of the progress of mankind. This all important point has been very forcibly stated by Professor Robinson:—

"There is no space here to discuss the general relation of history to the causes and technique of progress, but a word may be said of the effect which our modern outlook should have on our estimate of the conservative mood. Mr. John Morley has given an unpleasant but not inaccurate sketch of the conservative, 'with his inexhaustible patience of abuses that only torment others; his apologetic word for beliefs that may not be so precisely true as one might wish, and institutions that are not altogether so useful as some might think possible; his cordiality towards progress and improvement in a general way, and his coldness or antipathy to each progressive proposal in particular; his pygmy hope that life will one day become somewhat better, punily shivering by the side of his gigantic conviction that it might well be infinitely worse.' How numerous and how respectable is still this class! It is made up of clergymen, lawyers, teachers, editors, and successful men of affairs. Doubtless some of them are nervous and apologetic, and try to find reasons to disguise their general opposition to change by taking credit for improvements to which they contribute nothing, or by forwarding some minor changes which exhaust their powers of imagination and innovation. But how rarely does one of them fail, when he addresses the young, to utter some warning, some praise of the past, some discouragement to effort and the onward struggle! The conservative is a perfectly explicable and inevitable product of that long, long period before man woke up to the possibility of conscious betterment. He still justifies existing conditions and ideas by the standards of the past rather than by those of the present or future. He neither vividly realizes how mightily things have advanced in times gone by, nor has he the imagination to see how easily they could be indefinitely bettered, if the temperament which he represents could cease to be artificially fostered. . . .

"Now it has been the constant objection urged by the conservative against any reform of which he disapproved that it involved a change of human nature. He has flattered himself that he knew the chief characteristics of humanity and that, since it was hopeless to alter any of these, a change which seemed to imply such an alteration was obviously impracticable. This argument was long ago met by Montaigne, who declared that one who viewed Mother Nature in her full majesty

and luster might perceive so general and so constant a variety that any individual and even the whole kingdom in which he happened to live must seem but a pin's point in comparison. But there is a wholly new argument now available. Whether the zoölogists are quite right or no in denying the possibility of the hereditary transmission of acquired traits, there is no reason to think that one particle of culture ever gets into the blood of our human species; it must either be transmitted by imitation or inculcation, or be lost, as Gabriel Tarde has made clear. We doubtless inherit the aptitudes of our parents, grandparents, and remoter ancestors; but any actual exercise that they may have made of the faculties which we share with them cannot influence us except by example or emulation. *Those things that the radical would alter and the conservative defend are therefore not traits of human nature but artificial achievements of human nurture.* Accordingly, the anthropologist and historian can rule out this fundamental conservative appeal to human nature by showing that the most extraordinary variety has existed and still exists in habits, institutions, and feelings of various groups of mankind; and the student familiar with the chief results of embryology will see that the conservative has constantly mistaken the artificially acquired and hereditarily non-transmissible for constant and unalterable elements in our native outfit. And, indeed it may be asked, if it has proved possible to alter an invertebrate tadpole-like creature living in the sea into an ape-like animal sleeping in a tree, and to transform the ape-like animal into an ingenious flint-chipping artist, able to paint pictures of bison and deer on the walls of a cave, and to derive from the flint chipper of the stone age a Plato able to tell a most edifying tale about a cave full of conservatives, what becomes of the argument for the fixity of human nature in any important sense?"²⁴

Though this original and suggestive point of view, with its great emphasis upon the psychic factors in historical development, has gained no general acceptance among the conventional historians, its promise for the future can be gathered from the immense interest which Professor Robinson's lectures on the history of the intellectual class have aroused in recent years at Columbia University and the enthusiastic following he has developed among the younger and more progressive historians in this country. A considerable number of his students have made notable monographic contributions to various phases of intellectual history, and Professor Robinson is himself engaged upon a monumental synthesis of intellectual history which will not only illustrate his attitude towards historical interpretation but will also constitute the first comprehensive survey of the intellectual development of western civilization written from the standpoint of a scholar versed in the diverse trends of modern scientific thought, Dr. Draper's long popular work on "Intellectual Development" having been written too early to make use of the epoch-making progress in science and

²⁴ Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 253-58.

thought during the last forty years.²⁵ But if the significance of intellectual history has not as yet been consciously recognized by an extremely large number of historians, the amount of substantial work which has been done in this field is already enormous and, whether all of the writers have recognized it or not, constitutes the best possible vindication of intellectual history.²⁶

²⁵ The general scope of this work is forecast in Professor Robinson's detailed class syllabus entitled *An Outline of the History of the Intellectual Class in Western Europe*, pp. vii, 54. The most concise summary of his views is contained in Chapter IV of the *New History*. His point of view has also affected not only his own textbooks but those which have been written by his followers. See especially the acknowledgments in Lynn Thorndike's *History of Medieval Europe* and J. S. Schapiro's *Modern and Contemporary European History*.

²⁶ Only a few of the more notable works in this field can be mentioned here. From Great Britain have come E. B. Tylor's researches in primitive thought; the works of J. P. Mahaffy, Gilbert Murray, and Samuel Dill on classical thought; Rashdall's study of the medieval university; R. L. Poole's brilliant excursion into medieval thought; W. E. H. Lecky's precocious but brilliant analysis of the development of rationalism in modern times; John Morley's comprehensive appreciation of the writing of the 18th century rationalists in France; Leslie Stephen's monumental survey of English thought in the 18th and 19th centuries; A. W. Benn's history of modern English rationalism; J. T. Merz's massive and scholarly exposition of the progress of European science and thought during the last century; the brilliant and courageous attacks upon obscurantism which have been produced by Karl Pearson, J. B. Bury, J. M. Robertson, Joseph McCabe, T. H. Huxley, and Edward Clodd; the enduring contributions of Ernest Barker, J. N. Figgis, G. P. Gooch, A. J. Carlyle, W. Graham, D. G. Ritchie, Frederick Pollock, and Thomas Kirkup to the history of political theory; the studies in the evolution of economic thought by W. J. Ashley, James Bonar, Edward Cannan, J. K. Ingram, and Henry Higgs; the surveys of historiography by J. B. Bury, James Gairdner, Lord Acton, and G. P. Gooch; the investigations of the history of science by Karl Pearson, A. E. Shipley, W. C. D. Whetham, Ray Lankester, and J. A. Thompson; the history of legal ideas by James Bryce, Frederick Pollock, Edward Jenks, and F. W. Maitland; the surveys of the development of religious thought by E. B. Tylor, J. G. Frazer, R. R. Marett, Robertson Smith, Jane Harrison, L. R. Farnell, Warde Fowler, T. R. Glover, F. C. Conybeare, H. B. Workman, J. E. Carpenter, and C. Beard; and the studies in the history of aesthetics by J. A. Symonds, John Ruskin, J. P. Mahaffy, and Gilbert Murray. Germany has contributed the massive works of Edouard Zeller, Ulrich Wilamowitz Möllendorff, and Theodor Gomperz on the history of Greek thought; the brilliant and original work of Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm Windelband on the history of philosophy; W. Wundt's schematic survey of the development of culture from a socio-psychological point of view; the works of Rohde, E. Aust, G. Wissowa, Adolph Harnack, Karl Hase, and Ernst Troeltsch on the development of religious thought; the monumental treatments of the history of law and

5. *The Discovery of the Importance of the Unconscious Motives and Impulses in Psychic Life and its Significance for the Psychological Interpretation of History*

Within the last few years, however, there have been discoveries and advances in psychology which are of such far-reaching importance and of so revolutionary a nature that they threaten the well-nigh total discrediting of the conventional historical literature, in so far as it touches individuals and their motives, and would seem to indicate the necessity of re-considering much of even the most advanced socio-psychological interpretation of history. These phases of psychological progress to which reference is made are those connected with the discovery of, or the new emphasis which is placed upon, the importance of the instinctive, subconscious and unconscious impulses or motives in human conduct. These developments, while vaguely anticipated at an earlier date, are chiefly associ-

politico-legal theories by Otto Gierke, H. Brunner, R. Ihering, and R. Sohm; the studies of historiography by F. Wegele, E. Bernheim, and G. Wolf; the histories of sociological thought by Paul Barth and Ludwig Stein; the investigation of the history of science by E. Du Bois-Reymond, E. Mach, W. Ostwald, and F. Dannemann; and the studies in the history of aesthetics by Burckhardt, Gervinus, Gregorovius, Woltmann, and Lübke. France is represented in this field by the various monographic studies of the development of thought by L. Lévy-Bruhl; the brilliant contributions of Durkheim and his school to many phases of intellectual history; the encyclopedic publications of Solomon Reinach on every phase of the history of culture; J. Delvaillé's monumental work on the history of the concept of human progress; the works of A. Franck, E. Faguet, and Paul Janet on the history of political theory; Gide and Rist's notable survey of recent economic and social theory; the contributions of A. Bouché-Leclercq, G. Boissier, E. Renan, L. Duchesne, A. Loisy and E. Chénon to the development of religious thought; the studies in the history of science by Émile Boutroux, Gaston Milhaud, P. Duhem, and P. Tannery; and the work in the field of the history of aesthetics by Renan, Sainte-Beuve, Taine, Faguet and Reinach. Italy has been honored by the contributions of Benedetto Croce to the history of thought. The Scandinavian nations have produced able students in this field such as Harald Höfding and Georg Brandes. Belgium is ably represented by the contributions of Georg Sarton to the history of science, of Franz Cumont to the history of religion, and of G. De Greef to the history of sociological and political thought. In America the field of intellectual history was earliest cultivated by John W. Draper, whose works have long since become antiquated. Draper was followed by President Andrew D. White, whose vigorous assault upon obscurantism was the most powerful influence in bringing the educated American public into proper orientation with the progress of modern science, thought, and criticism in nearly every field. Henry Osborn Taylor has produced a scholarly survey of European thought to the close of the Middle Ages. Professor G. L. Burr

ated with the work of G. Stanley Hall, Thorndike, McDougall, Trotter, Shand, Janet, Morton Prince, and Freud, Jung, Adler, Jones and the others of the so-called "psycho-analytical school."²⁷ It was once confidently supposed that man is fully conscious of the impulses which move him to action, that if a person honestly avowed that he acted from certain motives there could be little doubt that he did so. If these premises were accepted, the task of the historian in establishing the facts in the case was the relatively simple one of determining the degree of honesty and candor in the statement. It has now come to be almost universally agreed, however, that even so much of this newer dynamic psychology as is beyond the least probability of error in fundamental principles, has demonstrated beyond any possibility of doubt that the great majority of human psychic reactions are produced by impulses or motives that are below the level of consciousness—that emerge unknown from the unconscious sources of

has devoted himself to a study of the history of superstition and the growth of toleration. Professors Dunning, Merriam, and Scherger have done notable work in the field of the history of political theory. Professors W. C. Abbott and W. R. Shepherd have indicated the reaction of the Commercial Revolution on European thought and culture. C. H. Toy, G. F. Moore, M. Jastrow, J. H. Breasted, R. W. Rogers, C. H. Moore, J. B. Carter, G. Fisher, G. S. Hall, N. Schmidt, A. C. McGiffert, E. C. Moore, and E. W. Hopkins have studied diverse phases of the development of religious thought. Lynn Thorndike, W. T. Sedgwick and W. Libby have dealt with the history of science. Roscoe Pound has shown the relation of the history of law to the general development of ideas. Finally, the history of aesthetics has been investigated by Charles Eliot Norton, Emily James Putnam, and Ralph Adams Cram. This vast mass of highly scholarly analysis of all phases and periods of intellectual history, together with the great volume of original sources bearing upon this subject, present to the progressive historian a field for productive work which is indeed inviting.

²⁷ We have no systematic history and analysis of the development of the psychology of instinctive and unconscious mental activity. W. McDougall's *Social Psychology*, E. L. Thorndike's *The Original Nature of Man*, Maurice Parmelee's *Personality and Conduct*, and Isadore Coriat's *Abnormal Psychology* cover the field fairly well. For the history of the psychoanalytic movement see P. C. Bjerre's *The History and Practice of Psychoanalysis* and S. Freud, *The History of the Psychoanalytical Movement*. The best elementary presentation of psychoanalysis is to be found in W. Lay's *Man's Unconscious Conflicts*; I. Coriat's *What is Psychoanalysis?* and W. A. White's *The Mechanisms of Character Formation*. For a more detailed study consult the works mentioned in the Introduction to Lay's book. Current developments in this field may be followed in the *Mental Hygiene Magazine* and the *Psychoanalytical Review*.

psychic life and power.²⁸ A much worn, but illuminating figure compares the psychic life and activity of man to the iceberg, with a great submerged mass of unconscious impulses and motives, and a relatively slight visible portion of conscious activity. Singularly enough this newer psychology is of particular importance for the older type of historian who believes historical events to be the product of the activity of the great personalities, to be based upon the element of the individual-psychic. This newer psychology must be admitted definitely to demonstrate that the older biographical historical literature is of little value, except in so far as it has brought together the information which will enable the historian of the future, armed with the necessary psychological knowledge, to interpret its real significance.

It would be easy, however, to overestimate greatly the degree to which this interesting advance in psychology can be utilized by the historian, as well as to be over-optimistic as to the rapidity and assurance with which it can be assimilated by the ambitious historian. In the first place, the new psychology of the unconscious is in its present state of development, at least, primarily a system of individual psychology. As the Carlylian interpretation of history in terms of the great personalities has suffered a serious eclipse during the last half century in favor of the socio-psychic interpretation, a type of psychology which leans distinctly towards the psychology of the individuals has its serious limitations as a mechanism for a complete interpretation of historical development. Again, few historians will take the time needed to acquire any reliable knowledge of the newer psychology, and probably even fewer psychologists will care to master the detailed facts of history. Further, it is only concerning personalities of recent times that we possess that volume of intimate information which would make it possible to gain even the most general knowledge of the unconscious motives of their psychic activity. Among figures from ancient times Cicero alone would furnish anything like enough evidence to make it possible to determine his complexes. Of all the Patristics, Augustine was the only one sufficiently introspective and voluminous in his

²⁸ With the exception of a few antediluvian organic neurologists and a still smaller number of academic psychologists, afflicted with an acute "defense-reaction," this fact is undenied by any informed student of present day psychology. It stands whether or not one accepts the Freudian mechanisms with which it is maintained that the skilled psychoanalyst can explore the unconscious. A denial of Freudianism in no way involves an elimination of the reality of the unconscious.

self-revelations to invite a fruitful psychoanalysis. Petrarch would probably be regarded as the first remarkable case for study by psychoanalysis as his "Confessions" have been designated by Professors Robinson and Rolfe as "the earliest unmistakable example of cool, fair, honest, and comprehensive self-analysis that we possess." Since the invention of the art of printing in the 15th century the mass of evidence dealing with historic personalities has become much more voluminous, but it is doubtful whether the most extensive and scholarly biography of the present day will furnish enough evidence to get very deeply into the subconscious motives of the individual being investigated. It must be remembered that it is difficult for the most skillful practising psychiatrist to get far enough into the patient's unconscious to secure enough data to effect a cure without from fifty to one hundred hours of direct personal questioning, and it is not to be supposed that the most complete biography, diary, or autobiography would present anything like that amount of direct personal information. Then, it must be remembered that the tendency of conscious expression, which makes up the greater part of written or spoken records, is towards the displacement, rationalization, projection, symbolizing or otherwise disguising of the real dynamic motives and impulses in the unconscious. Thus, the motives or reasons assigned for his particular act or policy, by the most honest and reliable individual may be, and, indeed frequently would be, as far from the real truth as the statement of the most notorious liar of his generation.

While these severe limitations upon the application of the new dynamic psychology of unconscious motives to the extension of our knowledge of the great personalities of history may seem rather disconcerting to the over-enthusiastic adherent to the more advanced psychological concepts and methods, it is only by keeping them well in mind that work in this field can be restrained from straying from the realm of probable facts of great value into the region of the fantastic and grotesque; in short, from history into poetry. But within these limitations this recent development of psychology, which has revealed the potency of the unconscious in mental life and has furnished us with at least a preliminary and tentative set of mechanisms for exploring the unconscious, can render the greatest service to history. It will certainly enable the historical student who is well grounded in the new psychology to bring out clearly the general character types,

and in many cases to disclose at least the major determining complexes of the leading individuals in history concerning whose personal life, thoughts, and activities any considerable body of evidence exists. It has now come to be a cardinal principle of dynamic psychology that the individual is a "creature of his complexes,"²⁹ and it is quite evident that without a knowledge of the complexes of an individual we can know little of the real motives and forces which influence his action. Psychology today completely rejects the notion that a certain stimulus of a given sort will affect all persons alike, but rather proves that the effect of the stimulus upon the individual will be in accordance with his complexes. It may be objected that this type of psychology applies chiefly to the abnormal types of man and that the great mass of normal individuals are affected by few or no subconscious complexes. While this position could scarcely be wholly accepted, it would at any rate have little bearing upon the question under discussion. As far as progress has been dependent upon the work of individuals, it has come from the contributions of the abnormal types, and the great mass of "normal" beings are born, live, and die in general "psychic ease and comfort," but without having contributed an iota to civilization and its further development.³⁰ The modern psychological historian who accepts the Carlylian interpretation of history will need to revise the famous phrase that history is "collective biography" to read that history is the record of the "collective sublimation of the neuroses and psychoses" of the great personalities of history. It becomes, therefore, quite evident that we can in no way escape the task of applying the new psychological mechanisms to the study of the leading personalities, at least to those in modern times, where we have some adequate body of evidence to serve as the basis for investigation. It is undoubtedly true that we can pass but little beyond the borderland of exploration in the unconscious of the most of the significant personalities, but we must certainly recognize that without knowing something of their basic complexes our knowledge of the real significance and causation of their thoughts and actions will be most imperfect. Surely no genuine and

²⁹ Modern psychology quite reverses the old adage that "as a man thinketh so is he." Rather is it true that as a man's complexes are so will he think.

³⁰ This fact, with its psychological explanation, is well brought out in the opening chapters of W. Trotter's *The Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War*.

conscientious historian will stop short of the impossible in the search for the last available item of vital information which will help to clear up our understanding of the past.

If one accepts the view that a knowledge of their complexes is essential to a complete understanding of the motives and impulses which have governed the actions of prominent personalities, then he must take a radically different attitude than is conventional towards the intimate personal experiences of the individual whose life is being examined. In the usual run of biographical writing the intimate private life of great personalities is either ignored entirely or set forth in a way designed to extol certain alleged virtues or obscure definite shortcomings of character. A candid revelation of every fact in the private experiences of a leading personality which will throw any light upon the sources of his impulses and activity is normally branded as scandal-mongering and stigmatized as evidence of gross bad taste, except when utilized by some noble patriot for partisan purposes in a presidential campaign. Especially subject to this restrictive taboo are those experiences of the individual in the sexual realm, the discussion of which mortally offends our venerable "impurity complex." Now the student of modern dynamic psychology finds that he must vigorously oppose this conventional procedure, for he knows that these tabooed private experiences are exactly what need to be known if we are to obtain some comprehension of the complexes of the individual. Even private sexual experiences cannot escape the scrutiny of the psychological historian in the pursuit of adequate biographical knowledge. George Washington's complexes cannot be gleaned from the story of the "cherry tree" or an account of his prayers at Valley Forge any more than Senator Dilworthy's speech before the Sunday school would reveal the life history or political intrigues of this famous character in Mark Twain's *Gilded Age*. It may well be held that incomplete information or imperfections of knowledge are greatly to be preferred to delving into that area of secrets and privacies which the historian has previously avoided or failed to utilize, but the acceptance of such an attitude should carry with it a frank confession that no vital interpretation of fundamental importance can be expected. It must further be recognized that even though the psychological historian is willing to waive the canons of conventional good taste in the interest of more complete historical knowledge, much of this information regarding the private life, especially the uncomplimentary or unsavory episodes, of

important personalities either has never found its way into documentary evidence or has been destroyed by reverent literary executors. The way of the psychological historian in the mazes of interpretative biography must inevitably be hard, like that of the proverbial transgressor.

Space does not here allow any serious attempt to analyze any of the great personalities of history, nor even to call attention to significant work already done in this field, but it may be of interest to direct attention to obvious instances where a detailed analysis of personalities on the basis of the mechanisms of the newer psychology would be, or has been, particularly fruitful. Nothing has been more consequential for the subsequent intellectual and social history of mankind than Augustine's notorious "impurity complex," which he fastened upon European thought so successfully and so deeply that we have not yet recovered from it. Even our archaic anti-birth-control legislation directly reflects its influence. It is now well understood that this was wholly a psychic compensation for Augustine's own wild youth and his varied and extensive sexual experiences. The psychoanalyst would have little difficulty in grasping the significance of Abelard's abnormal tendency towards doubting, his revolt against the authority of the Church Fathers and contemporary theologians, his inability to meet the adult sexual situation in matrimony, and his compensation in a near "delusion of persecution." Petrarch's abnormal introspective tendency has already been pointed out. The strange and mysterious character of that unique genius, Leonardo da Vinci, has inspired a study by the founder of psychoanalysis.³¹ Luther's tremendous mental conflicts in early life, and their final culmination in his open revolt against the "Holy Father" and in his zeal for "devil-mongering" cannot be fully understood except when dealt with in terms of dynamic psychology.³² One would like to know more about Voltaire's revolt from authority in the light of the psychology of his youthful experiences. Rousseau's whole literary and philosophical product is little more than a continuous sublimation of typical neurotic symptoms. That Napoleon was an epileptic is well known, and the chief source of his immense power and energy may well have been that unusual contact with the dynamic force in his unconscious,

³¹ S Freud's *Leonardo da Vinci*.

³² See Preserved Smith's original and scholarly article on "Luther's Early Development in the Light of Psychoanalysis," in the *American Journal of Psychology*, July, 1913, pp. 360-377.

concerning which William James wrote so clearly and forcefully.³³ Further research along this line may confirm the hypothesis that the great exponents of anarchy and individualism have elaborated their philosophy as an outlet for their repressions or as a revolt from authority. The derivation of both Kropotkin and Bakunin from autocratic and militaristic Russian society is a well-known and much commented upon fact. It is, further, common knowledge that the great individualists of the last century, Jefferson, Spencer and Mill, passed their childhood under an abnormally complete and severe domination and control by their male parent or some older male relative — the ideal situation for the development of a violent anti-authority complex. It is not unlikely that we shall one day learn that the obsessed attachment of Cecil Rhodes and Rudyard Kipling for the British Empire, symbolized by Britannia, was motivated by an exceedingly vigorous mother transference. Our own history furnishes ample evidence of the pressing need for a reconsideration of the traits of our leading personalities in the light of the newer psychology. Washington with his interesting "Jehovah complex," combining Olympic detachment with a Jacksonian temper; the utterly abnormal love of Hamilton for an authoritative political system and his accompanying fear of anarchy, which was in its intensity almost comparable to the well known phobia of open places; the violent anti-authority complex of Jefferson and its attendant feeling of inferiority, both of which were elaborated and defended in ten thick volumes of letters and public documents; the remarkable development of a "spotless soul" in James Monroe after his part in many questionable episodes such as the violation of his word in the publication of the Reynolds letters; the sadism and the "Jehovah complex" of Andrew Jackson, who was so intolerant of opposition as to be unable to complete a sentence in public debate without choking with anger; the love that Douglass possessed for union and authority which led him to break with the secession element in his party; Lincoln's hatred of slavery, his unusual tenderness for the oppressed, and his intense periodic depressions;³⁴ Thad Stevens' great concern over the freedom of the southern negro, while he led in the oppression of the southern whites and utilized the reconstruc-

³³ Especially his *The Energies of Men*.

³⁴ A comprehensive study of Lincoln's major complexes has been made by Dr. L. Pierce Clark in a paper read before the New York Psychiatric Society, March 5, 1919.

tion legislation to give a constitutional protection for corrupt and grasping business interests in the north; the "psychosis of sanctimony" which could bear the Crusader from Lincoln, Nebraska, unabashed through the slough of agrarianism and free-silver; the remarkable combination in Roosevelt of a Hamiltonian zeal for the "Big Stick" with an almost Jeffersonian sensitiveness to public opinion; and the Jovian aloofness, the procrastinating opportunism, the frequent, repeated and vigorous declarations of reliance upon the "best counsel of the nation," the continual shifting of position upon fundamental points, the defence-reaction in the choice of a cabinet of inferior calibre, the ostentatious parade of public virtue and well-advertized prayers in company with the Secretary of State, which characterize our present Chief Executive, are but a few interesting cases in which the newer psychology can contribute very greatly to a more complete mastery of American history.

While it must be always kept in mind that the psychology of the unconscious is in its present development primarily a system of individual rather than social psychology, it can also throw at least some light upon certain problems of more general or mass psychology.³⁵ Notwithstanding the contrary doctrines of Durkheim, it must be agreed that the social mind is at least based upon the individual minds in the group, even though it may be something quite different from the mere sum of those minds. Therefore, it is obvious that a new psychological discovery of such great import for individual psychology as the demonstration of the significance of the unconscious factors in mental life could not but be of interest to the student of the more general problems of the development of thought and culture.

In the field of the history of religious phenomena the new dynamic psychology can be of great aid in clearing up many hitherto perplexing or misinterpreted problems. The unconscious symbolism involved in primitive religion, mythology, art, and ritual has been ably analyzed by E. Crawley, Jane Harrison, and Gilbert Murray but needs a much more

³⁵ For a scholarly and lucid exposition of the limitations upon at least the Freudian psychology as a system of social psychology I am indebted to an unpublished address of Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser before the Psychological Club of Columbia University, 1918. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to extend Freudian psychology to an interpretation of socio-psychological phenomena is Freud's *Totem and Taboo*.

thorough analysis.³⁶ G. Lomer, Binet-Sanglé, H. Schaefer, and especially G. Stanley Hall, have shown how much modern psychology can contribute to a better understanding of the personality of Christ and of the derivation and significance of his teachings.³⁷ The deeper psychological significance of the symbolism in the sacramental system of the Catholic Church is a fertile problem awaiting a more complete investigation than has been accorded to it by Conybeare and others. The reasons for the phenomenal grip of the Catholic Church upon its communicants can never be wholly appreciated until one reflects that with its combination of the Papacy and Mariolatry it provides for an unique dual "transference" of the filial and sexual attachments of both female and male children to the "Holy Father" and the "Holy Mother," respectively. There can be little doubt that this fact, together with the well-established thesis of genetic psychology that attachments formed in childhood are much more vital and tenacious than those of later life, go further towards clearing up the problem of the strength of Catholicism than the important matter of its extensive organization. This also explains how a Catholic may be a violent radical in politics and yet retain a fervent devotion for the Church and its dogmas and ritual. The revolt against the political authority is an unconscious revolt against the male parent, while the Church symbolizes to the male believer his mother and thereby wholly escapes his anti-authority reaction. To the Protestant, on the contrary, with his chief emphasis on the Old Testament and its patriarchal religious concepts, and his rejection of Mariolatry, both Church and State symbolize the authority of the male parent and are rejected together. Again, only in the light of the newer psychology of the unconscious can one understand how the Catholic clergy has been able, when it has actually done so, to observe successfully the vow of chastity. It is a well-known principle of psychoanalysis that the blocking of the normal outlet for adult sexuality leads to a reversion to an infantile sexual level, and in the case of the male adult to a revival of

³⁶ A study along this line has been made by Dr. Karl J. Karlson, "Psychoanalysis and Mythology," in the *Journal of Religious Psychology*, November, 1914. See also C. G. Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*.

³⁷ G. Lomer, *Jesus Christus vom Standpunkte des Psychiaters* (1905); Binet-Sanglé, *La Folie de Jésus* (1908); H. Schaefer, *Jesus in Psychiatrische Beleuchtung* (1910); G. Stanley Hall, *Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology*, 2 Vols. (1917). See Hall, pp. 162ff. for a discussion of these psychological studies of Jesus.

infantile sexual attachment for his mother. In this manner the symbolism and ritual of Mariolatry have proved a veritable godsend to the Catholic clergy, for it has both strengthened their attachment for the Church and afforded a means of sexual release. In the intimate association of the semiclub life of the monastic orders at least a psychic homosexuality has also served as a means of aiding in the process of diverting the sexual impulses from their normal outlet. Further, the phenomenon of religious conversion was inexplicable until it was definitely shown that this was the result of breaking through psychic resistances and tapping the vast stores of new vital energy in the unconscious.³⁸ This, of course, throws light not only upon the problem of conversion in general but also upon the great historic instances of conversion like those of St. Paul, Augustine, St. Francis, and Loyola. Finally, while it has long been a common saying that a man's ability to drive a close bargain in a commercial transaction was directly in proportion to the length and resonance of his public prayers, it has only been since we have understood the mechanism of psychic compensation that we have known the scientific reason why excessive and ostentatious piety is normally correlated with hypocrisy.³⁹

That neither the nature nor the history of art and literature can be understood in any fundamental sense unless they are viewed primarily as the sublimation of the complexes of the great authors and artists is generally admitted. Indeed, it is very generally agreed that the successful aesthetic temperament is one in which the individual is in particularly close contact with, and in relatively full control of, his store of sub-conscious energy and impulses. This field has already been profitably explored in a number of suggestive analyses of leading artists and authors, and a general summary of the subject in its relation to literature has been made in the interesting work of Mr. Albert Mordell.⁴⁰ It seems to be equally clear

³⁸ It has also been shown that the acceptance of God or Christ in conversion is partly a readjustment to the authority of the earthly parent as well as to that of the Heavenly parent.

³⁹ In the light of this one should read Upton Sinclair's *The Profits of Religion*.

⁴⁰ *The Erotic Motive in Literature*. This work is severely criticized for its excesses by Francis Hackett in *The New Republic* for July 2, 1919, pp. 287-8, but Mr. Hackett freely recognizes the great value of the Freudian psychology for the interpretation of the motives of leading authors. No equal study has been made of the unconscious basis of art, but Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious* devotes some space to this subject.

that unconscious impulses are often the causative factor in scientific investigation. The recent careful study of the notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci has demonstrated that he was probably the most unique and remarkable genius in the history of science, and Freud had shown convincingly that his inordinate scientific curiosity was but a sublimation of the blocked and unsatisfied sexual curiosity of his youth.

The importance of the psychological factor in politics has long been recognized; Hume and Adam Smith, for example, comprehended many important psychic elements underlying government and political association, and since their day the literature in this field has been continually expanding, having been especially associated with the development of the different phases of social psychology.⁴¹ But it is now coming to be realized that no sound psychology of political activity can ignore the recent developments in the psychology of instincts, behaviorism, and the unconscious. As a recent writer has very well said:—

“This aspect of our teaching is perhaps best illustrated by our failure adequately to emphasize the importance of psychological analysis. We are, after all, dealing with an eminently human set of facts; yet there are few teachers who emphasize the impossibility of understanding political phenomena without a grasp of psychology. There are, indeed, few who do not know the change in perspective since Mr. Wallas drove the Benthamite psychology out of the political field. But, to take an obvious instance, we cannot explain the very fact of political obedience unless we are fully equipped with the latest knowledge psychology can offer. Do men obey, as Hobbes said, through fear? Is the real basis consent, as with Rousseau; or habit, as with Sir Henry Maine? The answer to this, and all kindred questions, we shall only know if we try fully to grasp and cautiously to apply, the things we are being taught by men such as Freud and Jung, McDougall and the behaviorists. It ought to be understood that no student is equipped for serious political analysis except upon the basis of a thorough acquaintance with these studies.”⁴²

How fruitful and suggestive the analysis of political activity and institutions can be when based upon the new dynamic psychology has been well illustrated by Walter Lippmann's “Preface to Politics” and Graham Wallas' “Human Nature in Politics” and “The Great Society.” It should be clear that these underlying psychological factors are as important for an understanding of political history as they are for an analysis of current political theories and problems.

⁴¹ See Ernest Barker's *Political Thought from Spencer to the Present Day*, pp. 148-158. Probably the most suggestive book in this whole field is E. A. Ross's *Social Control*.

⁴² *The New Republic*, March 1, 1919, p. 135.

While the limitations upon a direct transference of concepts applicable to the individual-psychic phenomena into the field of the socio-psychic must be recalled, there is little doubt that the basic Freudian concept of repression can be utilized to great advantage in explaining the problems connected with political revolutions.⁴³ In much the same way that excessive and prolonged repression of normal impulses in the individual tends to issue in an explosion in a neurosis or psychosis, so long-continued oppression of any economic, social, or political class is likely to lead to that violent eruption conventionally known as a revolution. The revolt of the peasantry in England at the close of the Middle Ages, and in Germany in Luther's time, the French Revolution and the insurrection of the June Days of 1848 are historic examples which have been often cited in this connection, but probably no other instance in history is quite as pertinent as the contemporary Russian revolution with its unparalleled proletarian upheaval. Mr. Graham Wallas has shown the significance of social repression in producing a general prevalence of what he calls "balked dispositions."⁴⁴ The late Professor Carleton H. Parker made it clear how the I. W. W. movement in this country is primarily a socio-psychic revolt against intolerable conditions forced upon the working classes in factories, mines and lumber camps.⁴⁵ Mr. Ordway Tead has provided a useful summary of the normal human instincts which should find an outlet if the laboring class is to live a happy or contented life, and has made clear how far most of these instincts are from satisfaction in the modern industrial and political order. If we accept the results of this suggestive line of work as valid, it must be agreed that most of the great revolutionary upheavals of the past were caused primarily by a psychic explosion after the duration, volume, and acuteness of the repression of the lower class had become no longer endurable. Not only do the revolts against the established order have a vital psychic content, but schemes of social and political reform, like the plots of novelists, are sublimations of the complexes in the uncon-

⁴³ No good psychological study of revolutions has yet been provided. LeBon's ambitious attempt aims primarily to substantiate his own views on social psychology by applying them to the data of the French Revolution and is generally unscientific and unsatisfactory.

⁴⁴ *The Great Society*, pp. 57ff.

⁴⁵ See his article on the I. W. W. Movement in the *Atlantic Monthly* for November, 1917.

scious of the reformer.⁴⁶ Again, in spite of the frenzied attempts of sociologists and publicists to rationalize the patriotic emotion, no fact could be better established than that patriotism owes its tremendous grip over the human mind to its symbolic power to throw back the mind upon that age-old instinct of group self-preservation.⁴⁷ Finally, as every profound student has freely recognized, the Great War has been from its background to the setting and procedure of the Peace Conference most fundamentally a psychological product, and no hope of an enduring peace can be rationally held unless a favorable psychological environment is created.

The significance of the modern dynamic psychology for the study of the evolution of social groups and institutions should be readily apparent. The late Professor William Graham Sumner, in his scholarly, suggestive, and comprehensive work on "Folkways," has shown how the fundamental guide to social conduct in every field is that vast mass of "folkways" and "mores" which have been reduced by habit and repetition to an almost instinctive level, thus making society extremely coercive in enforcing their observance.⁴⁸ Sumner did not, however, make sufficiently clear the deeper psychological processes through which these group habits became instinctive guides and channels of social conduct. It remained for the English surgeon and social psychologist, Wilfred Trotter, to analyze the nature and effect of that "herd-instinct" which has developed as a result of man's having depended for survival and progress upon his life in a social group, which could not have existed and endured without such discipline of its members as was required to give cohesion, unity, and direction to the group. This herd instinct is, however, not merely the basic psychic force preserving and compelling obedience to the folkways and mores, but is also the great factor in enforcing upon the individual mind those repressions of individual impulses and initiative which cause mental instability among so large a proportion of the population. Never before was the psychological basis of conservatism so clearly set forth nor its fundamentally instinctive rather than intellectual nature so

⁴⁶ Cf. Miss Blanchard's article "A Psychoanalytical Study of Auguste Comte," *American Journal of Psychology*, April, 1918, pp. 159-181.

⁴⁷ Cf. Professor F. H. Hankins, "Patriotism and Peace," Founder's Day Address, Clark University, 1919, *Clark College Record*, April 1919, pp. 114-121.

⁴⁸ William Graham Sumner, *Folkways*, particularly Chaps. I-II, XI, XV.

clearly proved.⁴⁹ Further, it would seem that the modern notions of unconscious factors in psychic life and their relation to group activity furnish the only possible means of reconciling the theory of Durkheim and his school that the social mind is the chief creative force in culture with the doctrines of those who emphasize the all-important nature of individual genius, initiative, and invention.⁵⁰ The psychic exuberance and stimulation which comes from close and intimate association in the social group probably results from the fact that this reversion to the intimate contact which characterized primitive life puts all the individuals in the group in a more direct contact with the store of psychic energy in their unconscious. It might be objected that this does not touch the matter of those inventive geniuses who have carried on their work in isolation, but it would seem safe to hold that they are only the few exceptions who prove the rule that man's mental activity and enthusiasm for creative work is normally far greater when in intimate association with those engaged upon a similar quest than in isolation.

There remain to be considered the psychological factors underlying the economic elements in social life. The economic interpretation of history has long been regarded as the last and most effective bulwark of philosophical materialism. Countless pretentious volumes have been directed against it by alarmed idealists and not a few historical scholars have conducted similar attacks.⁵¹ But even before the psychology of the unconscious was generally understood many students of economic history had ceased to claim a primacy for the economic factor as compared with all other elements which make for progress and development, and had held that the psychic factor was obviously the dominant element, though economic processes and institutions might exert a most important influence upon the psychological factors. In a recent able and suggestive paper Professor William F. Ogburn has carried this line of analysis still further and has pointed out the vital significance of unconscious psychological factors in the field of economic motives and activity. He has shown,

⁴⁹ W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

⁵⁰ See Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. The contrary view is held in Faguet's *Cult of Incompetence*; W. H. Mallock's *Aristocracy and Evolution*; and R. A. Cram's *The Nemesis of Mediocrity*.

⁵¹ Especially Shailer Matthews in his *The Spiritual Interpretation of History*, and E. D. Adams in his *The Power of Ideals in American History*.

among other things, how the economic motives are commonly disguised through the operation of such unconscious mechanisms as displacement, symbolism, projection, compensation, and rationalization.⁵² If his thesis is to be accepted, as it certainly may be in at least a tentative way, it would indicate that the economic factors are more all-embracing and far-reaching than was earlier supposed. In this connection there should also be mentioned the work of Mr. Tead already referred to regarding the importance of instinctive psychic reactions in economic life⁵³ and the brilliant if incomplete work of the late Professor Parker on both the instinctive and the unconscious psychic factors which lie at the basis of economic life and activity.⁵⁴ Thus, it can no longer be denied that even the economic factors in social life cannot be understood in any adequate, fundamental, or dynamic manner without a consideration of these problems in the light of the newer psychology.

Familiar illustrations from the history of our own country will bear out the assertion that the modern psychological mechanisms will go far towards interpreting more clearly those general policies and attitudes which have played a dominating part in our national history. How far, for example, was the austere impurity complex of the "glacial age" of New England Puritanism a psychic compensation for economic chicanery in smuggling and the rum trade? How far, again,

⁵² William F. Ogburn, "The Psychological Basis for the Economic Interpretation of History," a paper read before the thirty-first annual meeting of the American Economic Association, December, 1918. Printed in the *American Economic Review*, Supplement, March, 1919, pp. 291-305. The tremendous resistance which the newer psychological concepts meet even from original and progressive thinkers may be gleaned from the discussion of Professor Ogburn's paper by Professor Frank Fetter, unquestionably one of the most original of American economists and the most vigorous exponent of the conventional psychological economics. He contemptuously dismissed the Freudian psychology as a "degenerate psychology," giving as his only definite reason the fact that it is rejected by "a number of psychologists and philosophers of the best standing." It was curious that he did not remember that two decades earlier his own now generally accepted views on psychological economics were rejected by most American economists "of the best standing."

⁵³ Ordway Tead, *Instincts in Industry*.

⁵⁴ See his paper on "Motives in Economic Life," read before the American Economic Association, 1917, published in the *American Economic Review*, Supplement, March, 1918. See also his charming biography by his wife, entitled *An American Idyll*, published by the *Atlantic Monthly Press*. In this connection should also be mentioned Helen Marot's *The Creative Impulse in Industry*, and Thorstein Veblen's *The Instinct of Workmanship*.

were the philosophical discussions and the oratorical tirades concerning liberty, natural rights, and the right of revolution in the period following 1765 a defence reaction against the prevailing system of smuggling? It cannot be without some significance that the leading haranguer for liberty in Boston was fed and clothed by the leading smuggler, nor that the most conspicuous name on the Declaration of Independence was that of the most notorious violator of the customs regulations of Great Britain. Again, it would be interesting to know the psychological reasons why, as Sydney George Fisher has pointed out, the public statements of the leading colonial radicals indicate that their fundamental loyalty to Great Britain grew progressively more intense right down to July 1, 1776. It was long suspected and has recently been demonstrated that the legalistic arguments over nationalism and states-rights in the decade following 1789 were but the rhetorical drapery which covered the economic interests from the supporters of which Hamilton and Jefferson drew their following. Again, was not southern chivalry a collective compensation for sexual looseness, racial intermixture, and the maltreatment of the Negro? Further, as Professor Hankins has suggested, did not the abolitionist zeal of the New England deacons pleasantly obscure the fact that they and their fathers had gained their fortunes in rum trade with the Negroes of the West Indies? Then was Roscoe Conkling and his group more eager to conserve the "natural rights" of the Negro in the Fourteenth Amendment than to protect the corporation "nigger in the woodpile?" Were not the serious labor outbreaks of the "eighties" clearly an explosive revolt against the intolerable oppression of the labor element by the plutocracy during the great period of industrial expansion following the Civil War? And is the present frenzied adulation of the sanctity and fixity of the Constitution of the United States anything more than a concerted effort to protect and conserve the vested interests that have grown up under the protection of that document and its interpretation by a conservative Supreme Court?

In concluding this discussion of the relation of instinctive and unconscious mental activity to the psychological interpretation of history, it should be pointed out that these concepts greatly strengthen the notion of the continuity of history. It means that not only are the external or conscious aspects of culture handed down by education and other agencies, but also a vastly greater and more effective body of psychic motives and impulses are preserved in the realm of instincts and the unconscious.

III. SUMMARY

In this article the attempt was first made to trace the development of scientific historiography to the point where it has provided a vast storehouse of relatively accurate data for the historian; it was then shown that the work in this field of collecting sources and writing narrative political history was beginning to be supplemented by the next natural development of historical science, namely the interpretation of this vast amount of data in order to learn its significance in explaining the present order of things; next it was pointed out that, while there were a large number of interpretations of history offered, the psychological interpretation was gaining more rapidly in adherents than any other; Lamprecht's ingenious attempt at a schematic socio-psychological interpretation of history was then briefly described and its defects noted; Professor Robinson's views on this subject were then examined and the reasons were stated for believing that his prospectus marked a scientific advance over the system of Lamprecht through its wholly inductive procedure and its greater allowance for the individual psychic factors; finally, the more recent developments in psychology connected with the discovery of the importance of the instinctive and unconscious factors in psychic motives and impulses were mentioned and very briefly described, with a tentative survey of some possible applications of these new discoveries to the interpretation of historical material.

Whatever value one may assign to the psychological interpretation of history it must be admitted that it is yet but in its initial stages, and it would be rash to hope that it will gain in strength and volume with phenomenal rapidity in the near future. The great majority of "respectable" historians in most countries deny that history should concern itself at all with the problems of interpretation, or that it has any vital function in explaining the relation of the past to the present. Further, among the minority who believe that the interpretation of history marks the completion of scientific method in historiography, there is a division of opinion as to the most fundamental "interpretation." Finally, even those who accept the psychological interpretation of history are likely for some time to come to reject the more startling and original innovations such as the psychology of instincts, behaviorism, and above all, the new dynamic psychology of the unconscious. But no one need despair of a science which could advance from a

Gregory of Tours to a Waitz, an Aulard, a Gardiner or an Osgood, and from Aulard and Gardiner to Lamprecht, Seignobos, Maitland, Turner, Robinson, and Shotwell. We can even believe that a century hence a knowledge of that branch of psychology which Freud and his followers have elaborated will be regarded as a tool of the historian which is as indispensable to his success as Giry's manual on *Diplomatic* is to the present-day student of historical documents.